(Mr. Freedman was the 1st President Bush's Ambassador to Saudia Arabia)
February 26, 2003
Even a Superpower Needs Help
By CHAS W. FREEMAN Jr.
RIYADH, Saudi Arabia
Twelve years ago, this city shook under Scud missile bombardments and the roar of American and Saudi bombers on their way to pound Iraqi forces. It was the command center of two great coalitions: one was Western, led by the United States; another was Arab and Islamic, led by Saudi Arabia. Soldiers from 33 other countries fought alongside America's, risking their lives to reverse Iraqi aggression. Japan and Germany, unable then to send troops, joined Saudi Arabia and other Persian Gulf states in reimbursing America's military expenses.
Now the Saudi capital is quiet, a reminder of how little the coming war against Iraq will resemble the last one.
The Persian Gulf war is remembered by most people here as America's finest hour. The
United States led a broad international coalition to enforce the writ of the United Nations to liberate an Arab country. The coming war — which is intended to conquer an Arab country and to occupy it for as long as it takes to reshape it to American satisfaction — is viewed here as a potential catastrophe, not just for America's friends but for America itself.
There are lots of theories here about what the Bush administration really seeks in attacking Iraq. But few believe that this war and the resolution Washington presented at the United Nations this week are motivated by a burning desire to restore respect for the Security Council. And the support for the war from Prime Minister Tony Blair of Britain and from the leaders of some former Communist European countries strikes Saudis as being more about currying favor with Washington than about fear of Iraq.
With Iraq's armed forces just one-third the size they were in the last war and demonstrably unable or unwilling to resist or retaliate against daily American and British bombing attacks, the Saudis remain unconvinced that Saddam Hussein, detestable as he is, poses an imminent threat. An attack on Iraq that threatens his regime, however, would cause Iraq to lash out at Israel and the American homeland. Why, people here wonder, is Washington so intent on leaving Saddam Hussein with no choice but to try his hand as a suicide bomber with a global reach?
Secretary of State Colin L. Powell's brilliant presentation to the Security Council this month exposed Iraq's shell games with the inspectors. But to many here, his evidence showed a regime scrambling to retain the pathetic remnants of its former arsenal of terrifying weapons, not one pressing forward with new research, development and production.
Paradoxically, many Saudis feel that their main gain from a second American war with Iraq would not be the elimination of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, but the long-delayed departure from American troops from Saudi soil. The United Nations-related missions justifying the American soldiers' presence would disappear along with the Saddam Hussein regime. The kingdom will heave a sigh of relief when American forces withdraw after Baghdad is taken.
For now, however, Saudi Arabia's rulers, despite grave misgivings about the wisdom of American bellicosity, will never give Osama bin Laden what he wants: forcing American troops out or otherwise backing away from Washington. They do not want to throw away the possibility that past closeness might somehow, someday, be restored. So they will allow the United States Air Force to continue its current operations, to run the air war from Prince Sultan Air Base, and to have its planes fly over Saudi territory while attacking Iraq from elsewhere.
Saudi Arabia is, of course, only one of many allies caught between strategic reliance on America and strongly felt objections to its policies. Some have found it easier than others to finesse this dilemma. France and Germany have impaled themselves on it. Turkey pragmatically bargained for financial aid and a hand in shaping the future of northern Iraq to offset its political pain. Others are going along only to the extent that they must to avoid alienating the United States. There isn't much enthusiasm in the ranks, and there may not be much staying power either.
In Europe and Asia even more than in the Middle East, the Bush administration's stated determination to act regardless of the views of allies risks destabilizing longstanding alliances and partnerships. Whatever this war's effects on the region, globally it may be an even bigger roll of the dice for the United States than either its proponents or critics have argued.
For more than half a century, our foreign military bases, and our ability to move forces from Europe and Japan, have enabled the United States to project power to the Middle East and around the globe. It was through European bases that we carried out the emergency resupply of Israel in October 1973; marshalled troops, weapons and supplies for Desert Shield and Desert Storm; dropped food in Bosnia; and refueled the United States-based bombers that struck Baghdad in 1991, Belgrade in 1999 and Afghanistan in 2001.
Likewise, without fuel from the airborne tankers stationed in Persian Gulf Arab air fields, our attack planes aboard carriers in the Indian Ocean could not have reached targets in Afghanistan, or have returned safely. Without similar replenishment from bases in Japan, we could not sustain air operations over Korea and the Taiwan Strait, or reinforce and resupply our land and naval forces in Asia, or care for American wounded outside a future battle zone.
America has never before had the global reach it now enjoys. Foreign allies have made this possible. But Washington's contemptuous dismissal of European objections to war with Iraq, even as our forces use bases on their soil to prepare for it, is causing our friends to begin a potentially disastrous debate.
They are questioning more seriously whether American bases still serve their interests as well as those of a United States that is indifferent and unwilling to consider their views. They are asking themselves why they are still reimbursing America for much of the costs of these bases and troops, which are then used to do things to which they strongly object. They are questioning whether the political and economic burdens may not now outweigh the benefits.
Differences over Iraq have already led to speculation about an end to United States bases in Germany. Large antiwar majorities in Britain, Greece, Italy and Spain seem likely in time to make them an active political issue there as well. Especially if America stumbles into a war that is longer than expected, or if the occupation of Iraq turns ugly.
Similar uncertainties about bases — and particularly the social complications that inevitably arise from having a foreign military presence on one's territory — now strain our relationship with South Korea, and repeatedly erupt in Japan. Changes in one country will affect others. Our allies take their cues from each other's analyses as well as from our demeanor.
The last war with Iraq greatly enhanced American prestige and influence. The irony is that this war with Iraq, intended by its proponents to consolidate United States hegemony, may erode and undermine it. Even if things go well, it could yield weakened American alliances and influence, a more anemic presence overseas, a diminished capacity to project power, fewer options and allies in the Middle East, and an increased threat of terrorism. From here, it looks like a bad bet against long odds.
A committed Coalition of the Willing, drawn from allies and friends on six continents, won the last war in the gulf. This war will be fought by the United States, backed by a deeply divided Britain and a Coalition of the Sullenly Acquiescent.
-R Chas W. Freeman Jr., United States ambassador to Saudi Arabia from 1989 to 1992 and assistant secretary of defense from 1993 to 1994, is president of the Middle East Policy Council.
-R
"It's just too important to abide by someone elses sense of decorum"
